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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jesse Stephen Barber appeals from the judgment of conviction for domestic 
battery, elevated to a felony based on a finding that he had two prior convictions within 
the preceding fifteen years. On appeal, he asserts that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the district court's finding on the sentencing enhancement. In the alternative, 
he asserts that the district court deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury trial on 
the sentencing enhancement when it found the sentencing enhancement in the absence 
of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Jesse Stephen Barber was charged by Information with felony domestic battery 
(traumatic injury), and in the alternative, misdemeanor domestic battery; with respect to 
the misdemeanor domestic battery charge, the State filed a felony enhancement 
alleging two prior convictions for the same offense within the preceding fifteen years. 
(R., pp.23-24.) The matter proceeded to a jury trial, halfway through which Mr. Barber 
moved to act as his own attorney, and after a colloquy involving the requisite Faretta 1 
warnings, his motion was granted. With his consent, Mr. Barber's attorney was named 
standby counsel. (Tr., p.205, L.3 - p.213, L.22.) The jury acquitted Mr. Barber of felony 
domestic battery (traumatic injury), and found him guilty of the lesser-included charge of 
misdemeanor domestic battery. (Tr., p.380, L.9 - p.381, L.7.) 
1 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
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At what was apparently a court triai2 on the sentencing enhancement, the district 
court determined that the misdemeanor domestic battery charge amounted to a felony. 
(Tr., p.381, L.20 - p.384, L.6.) At sentencing, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of five years, with two years fixed. 3 (Supp.Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.11, L.1.) 
Mr. Barber filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., p.85.) 
2 Mr. Barber describes it as "apparently a court trial" because he was never asked 
whether he waived his right to a jury trial on the enhancement. For more on this issue, 
see the argument set forth in Part 11, infra. 
3 Mr. Barber filed a timely Rule 35 motion, seeking a reduction of his sentence. 
(R., pp.71-74.) The district court granted relief, over the State's objection, by retaining 
jurisdiction over Mr. Barber's case for one year. (R., pp.91-95.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to establish the facts necessary to find the felony 
enhancement, namely that Mr. Barber had two separate and distinct prior 
convictions for domestic battery? 
2. Was Mr. Barber deprived of his constitutional right to a jury trial when the district 
court found the sentencing enhancement in the absence of a knowing, intelligent, 




The Evidence Was Insufficient To Establish The Facts Necessary To Find The Felony 
Enhancement, Namely That Mr. Barber Had Two Separate And Distinct Prior 
Convictions For Domestic Battery 
Mr. Barber asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence from which 
the district court could have concluded that he had been previously convicted of the two 
separate and distinct domestic batteries necessary to elevate the domestic battery 
conviction in this case to a felony under Idaho Code § 18-918(3)(c). As such, the 
judgment of conviction must be vacated, with this matter remanded for resentencing on 
a conviction for misdemeanor domestic battery. 
Idaho Code § 18-918(3)(c) contains a provision that elevates a misdemeanor 
domestic battery to a felony, in relevant part, as follows: 
Any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of this 
subsection (3) [misdemeanor domestic assault or battery] who previously 
has pied guilty to or been found guilty of two (2) violations of this 
subsection (3), or of any substantially conforming foreign criminal violation 
or any combination thereof, notwithstanding the form of the judgment or 
withheld judgment, within fifteen (15) years of the first conviction, shall be 
guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state 
prison for a term not to exceed five (5) years or by a fine not to exceed five 
thousand dollars ($5,000) or by both fine and imprisonment 
I.C. § 18-918(3)(c). 
No Idaho appellate court has yet considered whether two prior convictions 
entered on the same date constitute separate and distinct convictions for purposes of 
the felony enhancement provided for in Idaho Code § 18-918(3)(c). As such, it is 
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necessary to examine Idaho appellate court decisions interpreting the general persistent 
violator enhancement statute, Idaho Code§ 19-2514.4 
In considering Idaho's persistent violator statute, the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
noted, "The majority of jurisdictions do not permit multiple convictions entered the same 
day or charged in the same information to be used to establish a defendant's status as 
a habitual offender" based on the logic that "a defendant should be entitled to an 
opportunity to reform himself between convictions or that the persistent violator statute 
seeks to warn first time offenders." State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341, 344 (Ct. App. 1986) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). In its first chance to interpret Idaho's persistent 
violator statute, the Court of Appeals adopted this majority rule, explaining, "Generally, 
we agree with the majority that convictions entered the same day or charged in the 
same information should count as a single conviction for purposes of establishing 
habitual offender status." Id. (emphasis added). It did incorporate an exception to the 
general rule, explaining, "[T]he nature of the convictions in any given situation must be 
examined to make certain that the general rule is appropriate." Id. 
Applying both the general rule and the exception to the facts of Brandt's case, 
the court explained that his prior convictions fell under the exception for the following 
reasons: 
The three offenses here were charged in three separate informations and 
each charge represented a separate crime occurring in a separate 
location with a separate victim. One of the crimes took place in February, 
1984, and the other two crimes in January, 1984. The judgments and 
sentences were imposed the same day because of a plea bargain 
4 Idaho Code § 19-2514 provides: "Any person convicted for the third time of the 
commission of a felony, whether the previous convictions were had within the state of 
Idaho or were had outside the state of Idaho, shall be considered a persistent violator of 
the law, and on such third conviction shall be sentenced to a term in the custody of the 
state board of correction which term shall be for not less than five (5) years and said 
term may extend to life." I. C. § 19-2514. 
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agreement that resulted in some charges being dismissed. One of the 
charges dropped happened to be a persistent violator charge. Since he 
had negotiated a dismissal of the first persistent violator charge, Brandt 
could hardly argue that he was not aware of the nature of such a charge 
or that he had not been warned of the consequences of repetitive criminal 
conduct. The purpose of our persistent violator statute is to punish repeat 
offenders by making their sentences for successive crimes more harsh. 
Id. at 344 (citation omitted). 
The general rule set forth in Brandt has since been applied several times by the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. In State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563 (Ct. App. 1999), the 
Court of Appeals upheld the district court's conclusion that two prior felony convictions 
from Arkansas fell within the scope of Brandf s general rule, thus precluding imposition 
of a persistent violator enhancement. The court described the facts underlying those 
prior convictions as follows: 
Harrington was apprehended while attempting to burglarize a local Piggly 
Wiggly. Harrington admitted during his interrogation that he had 
burglarized that very same grocery store ten days prior. The State of 
Arkansas filed separate indictments on the two charges, but they had 
consecutive case numbers. Harrington pied guilty to both charges on 
December 9, 1993, in one proceeding before the same judge. Sentences 
for both convictions were entered on the same day and were identical. 
Harrington, 133 Idaho at 565. In concluding that the district court correctly applied 
Brandfs general rule, the Court of Appeals explained, 
Admittedly, the charges have separate case numbers and separate 
informations, although filed simultaneously, but we cannot allow the state 
of Idaho to circumvent the general rule of Brandt simply because an 
Arkansas prosecutor declined to consolidate these cases. Harrington's 
convictions were basically separate parts of a common scheme or plan 
and obviously could have been charged in one information, thus placing 
him squarely within the general rule articulated in Brandt. 
Id. at 566. 
In two other cases, the facts of which are easily distinguishable from those of 
Mr. Barber's case, the Court of Appeals has found that the exception recognized in 
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Brandt applied. In one, the Court of Appeals noted that, although the two convictions 
were entered on the same day before the same judge, the "two prior felony convictions 
were unrelated crimes, grand theft and felony DUI, committed on different dates in 
different counties." State v. Mace, 133 Idaho 903, 907 (Ct. App. 2000). Furthermore, 
Mace did not even argue that the general rule in Brandt applied, having 
"acknowledge[d] that because his prior felonies were unrelated crimes charged in 
separate informations, they do not qualify for treatment as a single conviction under the 
rule enunciated in Brandt." Id. Instead, Mace argued for the exception to Brandfs 
general rule to be overruled, which the Court of Appeals declined to do. Id. In the 
second, the Court of Appeals found that the exception to the general rule applied 
because the "convictions were for separate crimes perpetrated on separate victims. 
They consisted of two burglaries in different counties, and one escape from a jail. 
These convictions were for distinguishable incidents of criminal conduct. Consequently, 
it was permissible to treat them as evidence of multiple prior felonies." State v. Smith, 
116 Idaho 553,560 (Ct. App. 1989). 
The only similarity between Mr. Barber's prior convictions and those that the 
court used in applying the exception in Brandt is that they were almost certainly charged 
in separate charging instruments, which can be inferred from the fact that two separate 
judgments were prepared, each containing a different case number. (State's Exhibit 
Nos. 4 and 5.) That, however, is where the similarities end. In contrast to the facts 
presented by the State in Brandt, there is no indication that Mr. Barber's prior 
convictions involved separate victims, separate incidents, separate locations, different 
dates, or that the cases were resolved via a global plea agreement. (State's Exhibit 
Nos. 4 and 5.) Nor is there any indication that Mr. Barber was warned, at the time of his 
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guilty pleas in those matters, that he would be subject to the strictures of Idaho Code 
§ 18-918(3)(c) for having been adjudged guilty of two separate domestic batteries. 
(State's Exhibit Nos. 4 and 5.) Additionally, the facts presented by the State are similar 
to those in Harrington in which the general rule was applied to bar application of the 
persistent violator enhancement. Specifically, Mr. Barber's two convictions were for the 
same charge (domestic battery), and resulted in identical, concurrent sentences of one 
hundred days in jail. (State's Exhibit Nos. 4 and 5.) 
Perhaps the State could have established facts similar to those in Brandt, Smith, 
and Mace in order to invoke the exception had it chosen to present charging 
instruments for the two cases, documents regarding a plea agreement, and/or 
transcripts from the plea hearings. Having chosen not to do so, the State failed to 
present sufficient evidence that Mr. Barber had two prior domestic battery convictions 
that were separate and distinct for purposes of the felony enhancement. 
Because the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Mr. Barber's two prior 
convictions for domestic battery were separate and distinct convictions necessary to 
invoke the exception to the general rule adopted in Brandt, he respectfully requests that 
this Court vacate the finding that the current conviction constituted a felony, and remand 
this matter for resentencing on his conviction for misdemeanor domestic battery. 
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11. 
Mr. Barber Was Deprived Of His Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial When The District 
Court Found The Sentencing Enhancement In The Absence Of A Knowing, Intelligent, 
And Voluntary Waiver Of His Right To A Jury Trial On The Enhancement 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Barber asserts that, if this Court rejects his argument set forth in Part I, 
supra, and finds the evidence was sufficient for the district court to find that he was 
subject to a felony enhancement, it should remand his case for a jury trial because the 
district court deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury trial on the felony 
enhancement, under both the Idaho and United States Constitutions, by doing so in the 
absence of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial. 
8. Standards Of Review 
1. Fundamental Error 
In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court adopted a 
fundamental error analysis applicable to most unpreserved claims of constitutional 
violations. For most such claims, the Court will only provide relief if the defendant 
satisfies a three-prong test by establishing that the error "( 1) violates one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Perry, 
150 Idaho at 227-28. 
Some unpreserved constitutional errors - "structural defects" - are of such 
magnitude that they defy the application of the harmless error test set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The 
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constitutional rights underlying such structural defects "are so basic to a fair trial that the 
violation of those rights requires an automatic reversal and is not subject to harmless 
error analysis." Id. at 222 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991 )). 
Structural defects are those "which affect 'the framework within which the trial proceeds, 
rather than simply an error in the trial process itself' and thus are so inherently unfair 
that they are not subject to harmless error analysis." Id. (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
at 307-08.) 
In Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the United States Supreme Court 
had only found the following errors to structural: "(1) complete denial of counsel; (2) 
biased trial judge; (3) racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury; (4) denial of 
self-representation at trial; (5) denial of a public trial; (6) defective reasonable doubt 
instruction; and (7) erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice." Id. (internal 
citations omitted). The Perry Court noted, "[a]lthough there may be other constitutional 
violations that would so affect the core of the trial process that they would require an 
automatic reversal, as a general rule, most constitutional violations will be subject to 
harmless error analysis." Id. at 222-23 (citation omitted). In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 
U.S. 275 (1993), the United States Supreme Court, discussing the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial, concluded, "[t]he deprivation of that right, with consequences that are 
necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as 'structural 
error."' Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281-82. 
2. Waiver Of A Constitutional Right 
"[T]he state has a heavy burden in overcoming a presumption against the waiver 
of constitutional rights." State v. Bainbridge, 108 Idaho 273, 276 (1985) (citation 
omitted). On appeal, a waiver of a constitutional right "will be upheld if the entire record 
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demonstrates the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." State v. 
Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 95 (2004); see a/so State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 498 (1983) 
(appellate court looks to the totality of the circumstances when assessing whether trial 
court properly found a valid waiver of a constitutional right). 
C. Mr. Barber Was Deprived Of His Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial When The 
District Court Found The Sentencing Enhancement In The Absence Of A 
Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary Waiver Of The Right To A Jury Trial On The 
Enhancement 
Article I, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution, in relevant part, provides, "[t]he right 
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate ... A trial by jury may be waived in all criminal 
cases, by the consent of all parties, expressed in open court .... " lo. CONST. Art. I § 7. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in relevant part, provides, "[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Idaho Constitution provides 
greater protection of the right to a jury trial in a criminal case than the Sixth Amendment. 
See State v. Wheeler, 114 Idaho 97, 100-01 (Ct. App. 1988) (Sixth Amendment 
guarantees jury trial only for "serious, non-petty offense[s]," while Article I, Section 7 
guarantees jury trial for "all public offenses which are potentially punishable by 
imprisonment or where potential fines or other sanctions are punitive in nature") 
(citations omitted). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a persistent violator 
enhancement is an issue of fact that must be determined by a jury under Article I, § 7 of 
the Idaho Constitution. State v. Dunn, 44 Idaho 636, 640 (1927). 
In concluding that a criminal defendant may waive his Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial, the United States Supreme Court has explained that because the right is so 
important it must be "jealously preserved," and, "that, before any waiver can become 
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effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had, 
in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant." Patton v. United 
States, 281 U. 276, 312 (1930), abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 
399 U.S. 78 (1970) (emphasis added). The Court concluded by noting, "[T]he duty of 
the trial court in that regard is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with 
sound and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures 
from" the preference for trial by jury, with the court's "caution increasing in degree as the 
offenses dealt with increase in gravity." Id. at 312-13. 
In State v. Cheatham, 139 Idaho 413 (Ct. App. 2003), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
considered, as an issue of first impression in Idaho, what steps a district court must take 
in order to find a valid waiver of a defendant's right to a jury trial under Idaho's 
persistent violator statute, Idaho Code § 18-918(3)(c). Cheatham, 139 Idaho at 416. 
Following a jury trial at which Cheatham was convicted of the underlying crimes, the 
district court inquired of defense counsel as to whether Cheatham stipulated "as to Part 
II of the Information." In response, defense counsel stated, "Judge, we'll admit that 
those allegations are true." Id. at 414-15. In describing the circumstances underlying 
this stipulation, the Court of Appeals noted, "Cheatham was present at the time of this 
stipulation, but did not speak to the court. The trial court did not ask Cheatham whether 
he voluntarily assented to the stipulation or understood its effect on his potential 
sentence." Id. at 415. 
The Court of Appeals began its analysis "with the recognition that under Idaho 
law, when a persistent violator enhancement is sought, the defendant is entitled to a 
jury trial on the State's allegations of previous felony convictions." Id. at 416 ( citing 
Dunn, 44 Idaho at 640). The Court of Appeals concluded that more than a stipulation 
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was required in order for a defendant's right to a trial on the enhancement to be waived. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals reasoned that "due process principles 
preclude the acceptance of a stipulation to the truth of persistent violator allegations 
without judicial inquiry to determine that the defendant makes the admission voluntarily 
and with an understanding of the consequences." Id. at 418. It further explained, 
"Under Idaho law, the detriment from being found a persistent violator is dramatic ... 
The defendant may be subject to a sentence 'many times as great as that prescribed by 
statute for the offense."' Id. (quoting State v. Lovejoy, 60 Idaho 632, 638 (1939)). 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that a waiver of trial on a persistent violator 
enhancement "will be valid only if the record shows that the defendant entered into the 
stipulation voluntarily in the sense that the defendant was not coerced, and knowingly in 
the sense that the defendant understands the potential sentencing consequences." Id. 
The following portion of the transcript containing the stipulation and its aftermath 
illustrates that the requirements set forth in Cheatham were not satisfied. Following the 
jury's guilty verdict on the misdemeanor charge of domestic battery, the district court 
began the jury trial on the enhancement allegation set forth in Part II by reading that 
portion of the Information to the jury, and explaining that it "requires us to reopen the 
cases [sic], take evidence on those alleged prior convictions." (Tr., p.381, L.20 - p.382, 
L.11.) 
As the State sought to call the investigating detective from this case to testify, 
Mr. Barber interjected, stating, "I'm not denying that I have two prior convictions." 
(Tr., p.382, Ls.13-22.) At that point, standby counsel stated, "It would make it easier, 
Your Honor, if we just stipulate that he has the two prior convictions from 201 O." 
(Tr., p.382, Ls.23-25.) The district court then inquired of Mr. Barber as follows: 
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"Mr. Barber, the issue is whether you have two prior convictions within the past 15 years 
of this particular code section, domestic battery. Is that something you're willing to 
stipulate to or do you want to require the State to put on evidence?" (Tr., p.383, Ls.1-6.) 
In response, Mr. Barber stated, "Yeah, I'll stipulate to that." (Tr., p.383, Ls.7-8.) 
Immediately thereafter, the district court announced, "Based upon that stipulation in 
court, then, as a matter of law the Court finds that there are two prior convictions of 
domestic battery, which would make this a felony conviction on the alternative charge." 
(Tr., p.383, Ls.9-13.) 
The district court then asked the State whether it had anything "to take up," to 
which the State responded that it sought "for clarity purposes" to admit State's Exhibit 
Nos. 4 and 5, the certified copies of the prior judgments of conviction, which were 
admitted without objection. (Tr., p.383, L.14 - p.384, L.3.) The district court then 
discharged the jury, explaining, "That resolves that particular factual issue ... so that 
does resolve the case." (Tr., p.384, Ls.4-6.) At no time did the district court inform 
Mr. Barber what the consequences of a finding on the enhancement were, or ask 
whether, by his stipulation, he intended to waive his constitutional right to a jury finding 
on the enhancement. 
With respect to the first prong of the Perry test, the error violated one of 
Mr. Barber's unwaived constitutional rights. With respect to the second, the error was, 
in light of the Court of Appeals' holding in Cheatham, plain on the record. With respect 
to the third prong, Mr. Barber notes that, in light of the United States Supreme Court's 
holding in Sullivan that a deprivation of the right to a jury trial is structural error, he need 
not establish that the error was not harmless in order to prevail on appeal. Assuming 
that this Court finds that Mr. Barber must establish that the error was not harmless, he 
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hereby incorporates the argument set forth in Part I of this brief to demonstrate that the 
error was not harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Barber respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the judgment of conviction for felony domestic battery, and remand this matter 
for sentencing on the conviction for misdemeanor domestic battery. In the alternative, if 
this Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the district court's finding as to the 
enhancement, or declines to reach that issue, he respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the enhancement finding, and remand this matter for a jury trial on the 
enhancement. 
DATED this 2ih day of February, 2013. 
SPENCERJ.HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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